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THE DELIVERY REQUIREMENT: AN ILLUSORY BAR TO
REGULATION OF MANIPULATION IN
COMMODITY EXCHANGES*
MANIPULATION on commodity exchanges, when accomplished by the inten-
tional use of economic power to influence market prices for private gain, is an
activity so like ordinary market behavior in many of its manifestations that,
while it is prohibited by federal statute,' courts have had considerable difficulty
in determining what acts are proper indicia of its occurrence. 2 In the recent
case of T/olkart Bros. v. Freeman, 3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals faced
these recurrent problems, expressing great caution about disturbing the mar-
ket's ordinary operation by too broad enforcement of anti-manipulation rules.
4
To understand the court's treatment of the manipulation problem, then, it is
first necessary to understand the ordinary operation of commodity exchanges.
Commodity exchanges are markets for the purchase and sale of rights to
receive and deliver such commodities as cotton or grain during a specified
future "delivery month," up to eighteen months distant.5 Though variations
*Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
1. 49 Stat. 1491 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17(a) (1958).
2. See, e.g., General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948), where the
court, faced with a charge of attempted manipulation of rye prices, held, after an exhaus-
tive investigation, that no manipulation had occurred; and Great Western Food Distrib.,
Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953), where an
examination of price differentials, commercial practices and the petitioners' conduct and
statements compelled a finding of manipulation. The problems of excessive speculation,
manipulation and consequent price fluctuations seem to have accompanied futures trading
(trading on commodities exchanges) since it first developed in Chicago shortly before the
Civil War. Futures trading grew from the practice of trading in grain "to arrive" at a
subsequent date. This practice was necessitated by poor transportation conditions during
the nineteenth century, and vastly encouraged the already popular speculation in grain.
With the development of contracts which were to be satisfied at some time in the future,
"short" sales by speculators who did not own grain at the time of the transaction became
possible. Schemes to dominate prices were by no means uncommon. See generally, HoFF-
MAN, FuTURE TRADING uPoN ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKTs IN THE UNITED STATES,
13-23 (1932). Similar operations in commodities other than grain have not been uncom-
mon. See HUBBARD, CoTToN AND THE COTTON MA~rxr 392-96 (2d ed. 1927).
3. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
4. See id. at 59-60.
5. Such a transaction on its face obligates the seller to deliver to the purchaser ware-
house receipts for the agreed-upon quantity of the commodity at any time during the
delivery month. BAER & SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 135
(1949). See also Brief for the New York Cotton Exchange, as Amicus Curiae p. 5, Vol-
kart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962) (hereinafter cited as Exchange Brief).
Few major works have appeared on futures trading and commodity exchanges in general.
The most prominent are HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, and BAER & SAXON, supra. Several
articles treat various aspects of futures trading and its regulation. See, e.g., Campbell,
Trading in Futures under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 215
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occur, the movement of prices on these "futures" markets parallels price
changes on the actual, or spot, markets where physical goods are traded. G By
virtue of this relationship, the exchange serves as a source of insurance against
disastrous price changes for merchants or others engaged in spot transactions. 7
Thus, a buyer of physical wheat, to hedge himself against a fall in the price of
wheat which he will be unable to sell for a period of time, will sell wheat fu-
tures at the time he makes his commodity purchase. When he later sells the
actual wheat, he will make corresponding purchases of wheat futures, that is,
"offset" the original sale of futures.8 Assuming that the futures-spot price re-
lationship has remained stable, the effect of any change in commodity prices
will be compensated by the effect of the hedger's reverse transaction in the fu-
tures market. Similarly, if, prior to purchasing wheat, a grain merchant has
committed himself to delivery, he may purchase wheat futures at the time of
his commitment to insure himself against a price increase. When he is ready to
buy the physical grain he will sell his futures. Assuming again that the futures-
spot price relation has remained constant, the merchant will be compensated
for any possible loss on his spot transaction by a profit on the futures ex-
change. 9 Although hedging his spot commitments on the futures exchange may
on occasion result in a merchant's losing potential profits from spot price fluc-
tuations, such losses will not concern him, since he desires to make his profits
not by speculating on price changes but rather from purchases and sales of
commodities.' ° Speculators, on the other hand, enter the futures exchanges in
significant number, precisely for the purpose of profiting from such price fluc-
(1958) ; Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organiced Exchanges,
27 AM. EcoN. REv. 267 (1937) ; Working, Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 Am. EcoN.
RPv. 314 (1953) ; Working, New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets, 52 AM. EcoN.
Rav. 431 (1962) ; Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE
L.J. 822 (1951) ; Note, 64 YALE Lj. 906 (1955) ; Comment, Manipulation of Commodity
Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 94 (1953).
6. HOWELL, PRICE RISKS FOR COTTON AND COTTON PRODUcTS 23; U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRICULTURE, TECI. BULL. No. 1119, (1955).
7. Hoffman describes exchange operations thus: "The entire activity of future trading
consists in either assuming risk as speculators or shifting risk as hedgers." HOFFMAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 4. See also Working, Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 A-m. ECON
REV. 314, 315 (1953) ; HOWELL, op. cit. supra note 6.
8. Despite the terms of the contract noted supra note 5, an "offset" is an acceptable
alternative to delivering warehouse receipts. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain &
Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 246-48 (1905).
9. This method of insurance is not complete. At times, due to inexact responses to the
largely identical conditions which influence both futures and spot markets, prices may not
change proportionately, and the hedger will thus gain or lose somewhat on his hedge.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., HOW TO HEDGE COMMODITIES 17-19
(1961). Occasionally, though rarely, changes in the futures-spot price relationship (the
basis) exceed spot price changes, in which case the trader risks more by hedging than by
not doing so. There is little question, however, that basis risks are normally far smaller
than the price risks avoided by hedging. BAER & SAXON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 206,
219-29.
10. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, ,FENNER & SMITH, INC., op. cit. supra note 9, at 10.
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tuations. The speculator plays an important role on the exchange by swelling
the volume of trading and providing the liquidity necessary to its smooth func-
tioning."
Because of the peculiar functions the futures market fulfills for its parti-
cipants, delivery of the actual commodity during the delivery month is an event
unexpected and undesired by the ordinary trader.12 A speculator would be
hard put to meet a delivery requirement, and he is totally unprepared to take
delivery. A hedger selling futures will doubtless prefer using the stocks in his
possession for processing or a sale on the spot market to delivering them on
the futures exchange.' 3 The buyer of futures will desire delivery even less,
since according to the terms of the futures contract, a range of qualities can be
delivered, on any day during the delivery month 14--a situation which makes
purchase of actual commodities on the futures exchange highly unattractive to
a merchant with specific needs at specific times.15 Despite this hostility to
bringing actual commodities into futures dealings, the standard futures con-
tract contains the terms of an ordinary sales agreement ;16 if the contract is
not offset before the last day on which trading in that future is allowed by the
11. BAER & SAXON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 53-54; Campbell, supra note 5, at 219-29.
Speculation, despite its clear necessity to the smooth operation of exchanges, has been
severely attacked for causing price fluctuations and high futures prices. BAER & SAXON,
op cit. supra note 5, at 55-58.
12. Working's discussion of futures trading is significant. He regards its basic func-
tion as promoting economy and convenience in hedging and speculation. Any other defini-
tion, he believes, tends to obscure and confuse the distinction between futures trading and
other types of commodity operations. Working, Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 AM.
Ecow. REv. 314, 315-17 (1953). See also, Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity
Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 839 (1951) ; HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 314.
One commentator has even hypothesized that in a perfectly functioning futures exchange,
no deliveries would occur. BAER & SAXON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 210.
13. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., op. Cit. supra note 9, at 37.
14. BAER & SAXON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 133-34; N.Y. CorroN EXCHANGE, BYLAWS
(as amended, 1932) § 120 (F) ; App. to Brief for Respondents, p. 23, Volkart Bros. v. Free-
man, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962) (hereinafter cited as Respondents' App.). The rule as to
delivery of a variety of grades has a strong justification: it makes it more difficult for buyers
to buy up all deliverable commodities and execute manipulative "corners." See infra note 25
and accompanying text. HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 318-19. For a good example of
the need for this rule, see 7 FTC, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 251 (1926).
15. Occasional traders, of course, are either in a position in which they can or may even
desire to take delivery. They may have constantly varying commitments and may find it
profitable to take delivery on some contracts when commodities are needed promptly and
purchase on the spot market is for some reason inconvenient. See Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1955). Similarly, merchants who buy and sell
varying qualities may be undisturbed by the inability to know certainly what grades they
will receive. Even these traders will be discouraged somewhat from taking delivery, how-
ever, by the fact that deliveries are normally of the lowest quality acceptable and hence
may not be of use to the trader who receives them. See BAER & SAXON, op. cit. supra note
5, at 137.
16. For typical futures contracts, see Id. at 134-35; N.Y. CorroN EXCHANGE, op. cit.
supra note 14, at § 119.
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exchange-or if a trader insists on literal satisfaction of his contract rights-
it must be fulfilled by conveyance of the physical commodity. 17 The exchanges
provide substantial penalties, in addition to ordinary contract damages, against
those who fail to meet their delivery obligation.' 8
Retention of the delivery requirement is beneficial, since it works to main-
tain the general equivalence of futures and spot prices which is necessary if
hedgers are to be protected effectively against losses arising from price fluctu-
ations. This equivalance is occasionally disrupted by fluctuations in the futures
price unrelated to price movements on the spot market. If the futures price ad-
vances significantly above the spot price, traders will be induced to "spread"
-to buy quantities of the actual commodity at the relatively low price and
simultaneously to sell futures. Later, they may make delivery on their futures
contracts with the spot commodity purchases, or, if the normal futures-spot
price relationship has been restored, offset and sell their spot holdings, in
either case reaping a considerable profit. The influx of futures sales and spot
purchases in response to the nearly certain profit which this situation offers,
generally tends to bring the futures and spot prices together.' 9 Similarly, if the
futures price drops significantly below the spot price, futures will be bought
and spot commodity sold. If this activity is not sufficient to drive prices back
together, a further impetus toward restoration will usually develop as futures
purchasers refuse to offset in the final days of trading, inducing sellers to bid
the futures price up in order to avoid the often substantial inconvenience of de-
livery.20
Although the market has this corrective mechanism, the disruptions of the
futures-spot price equivalance which do occur impair the success of market
operation. Such disruptions may be caused by factors, such as the threat of
17. Indeed delivery, if desired, is assured in every exchange by a clearing house system,
which, at the end of each trading day, clears all contracts, inserting itself into each trans-
action as buyer to every seller, and seller to every buyer. By essentially replacing both parties
to each agreement, it is able to guarantee performance on both sides. Its operations are large-
ly financed by the depositing of margin with the clearing house by each member to assure
performance of his contracts. For a detailed discussion of the clearing house, see BAER &
SAxox, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. 9.
18. Respondent's App. at 131.
19. HOFFMAN, op. cit. mipra note 2, at 256-58; HowELL, op. cit. sMpra note 6, at 24.
20. Though most dislocations in which futures prices are relatively low can be corrected
merely by purchasers waiting until late in the delivery month to liquidate, such dislocations
have occasionally persisted for several months, even when spreading was used and delivery
demanded. See HOFFMAN, op. cit. suPra note 2, at 257-58. This operation is also frequently
utilized by intelligent speculators to profit from price imbalances between two separate
futures markets, or two separate futures within the same market. Some price relationship
normally exists between various markets for a single future and between various months of
the future on the same exchange. Although these relationships are not as clear-cut as that
between spot and futures prices, clear price imbalances sometimes occur, and traders can
profit from them, in the first case, by buying on a low market and selling on a high one, or,
in the second, by purchasing futures of the abnormally low month, and selling those of the
high one, liquidating all interests when the imbalances are cured. BxaE & SAxoN, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 41-42.
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war, which are beyond the control of futures traders.2 ' But other price move-
ments may be the result of such deliberate trader activity as the spreading of
rumors, undertaken to influence the market price for the trader's benefit. 22
Similarly, traders, by failing to offset during the last days of trading in a fu-
ture, may obtain substantial control of outstanding issues in order to capitalize
on the usual seller unpreparedness for delivery.23 The inconvenience of late
preparation for delivery induces the sellers to bid up offset prices in a last-
minute effort to avoid having to deliver, yielding substantial profit to the
trader who has held out.24 If the trader has simultaneously purchased a suf-
ficient quantity of the commodity in the spot market to dry up the sources of
deliverable goods, the operation is denoted a "comer" ;25 if the futures market
21. Dislocations related to war or national disaster may create severe shortages and
drive prices up sharply. Though some such dislocations have occurred on the New York
Cotton Exchange, on which Volkart Bros.' contested operations took place (Exchange
Brief, pp. 20-21, n.6), the rarity of these occurrences and the fact that manipulative opera-
tions are usually unrelated to them make further reference to this sort of operation un-
necessary. Less severe disruptions can occur as a result of inexact responses of the two
markets to the largely identical forces which influence them. For an outline of some factors
which can affect the markets differently, see MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 18. See also HOWELL, op. cit. supra note 6, at 24-27.
22. See 7 FTC, REPORT ON THE: GRAiN TRADE 256-58 (1926). For examples of these
operations see Reuben Earl McGuigan, 5 Agri. Dec. 249 (1946); Ralph W. Moore, 9
Agri. Dec. 1299 (1950), aff'd, Moore v. Brannan, 191 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 860 (1951).
23. Comment, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case,
21 U. CGi. L. REv. 94, 95 (1953) ; see HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 315-18.
24. It should be noted that sellers can, on occasion, panic buyers and thus drive prices
down to their profit. Sellers accomplish this operation by issuing warehouse receipts in
large numbers at the start of a delivery month. These are distributed by the clearing house
of the exchange among outstanding buyers. See supra note 17. If a buyer does not wish
delivery, he must, within a half-hour, sell a quantity of futures equal to the warehouse receipt
and deliver the receipt to the new buyer. If large numbers of warehouse receipts are delivered
to purchasers unwilling to take delivery, panic selling and a fall in prices might occur. Com-
ment, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. CHr. L.
REv. 94, 102 (1953) ; BAER & SAxoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 182-84; see HOFFMAN, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 314-15. This procedure, however, at least has the advantage of informing
buyers explicitly that delivery is to be made. When a purchaser desires delivery, on the other
hand, he merely fails to offset his interest. Sellers are influenced to drive up prices in a rush
to offset, not so much due to an explicit indication by the buyer, but merely due to the time
deadline which forces them either to deliver or offset before the end of the delivery month.
The potentially powerful position in which this ambiguous situation may put purchasers
leaves it not immune to criticism. See infra note 73.
25. Some very extreme examples of the corner have occurred. See e.g., Great Western
Food Distribs, Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
In that case, petitioners bought large interests in both the spot and futures egg markets in
Chicago. They ultimately controlled better than half the deliverable spot supply and about
75% of the December futures, positions which enabled them to demand handsome premiums
for liquidation. G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F2d 286 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 907 (1959) (another corner of egg futures) ; Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th
Cir. 1938) (a massive corner in the corn market) ; and United States v. Patten, 226 U.S.
525 (1913) (a cotton corner).
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alone is dominated, the trader's action is referred to as a "squeeze". 26 The
sharp, if brief, price fluctuation which results from such conduct or from the
equivalent activity of a large seller of futures who begins to issue notices of de-
livery which purchasers are anxious to avoid, can also be caused unintentional-
ly. Thus, when merchants fail to liquidate their holdings of futures because
spot transactions have not been completed until shortly before the close of
trading, their late holding may lead sellers, fearing that delivery may be de-
manded of them, to bid up prices in attempts to offset.27 Whether intentionally
or unintentionally caused, the price fluctuation, by disturbing the expectations
of both hedgers and speculators, can cause considerable harm.28
Recognition of this harm led Congress to adopt regulatory measures, now
principally embodied in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,29 which pro-
vides both administrative and penal sanctions against those who "manipulate
or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity." 3 Price manipulation
is not explicitly defined in either the statute or its legislative history. The
courts and the judicial officer of the Department of Agriculture who ad-
ministers the regulatory scheme have nonetheless given substance to the con-
cept, defining manipulation to include "any and every operation or transaction
or practice calculated to produce a price distortion of any kind in any market
26. Though squeezes are rarely so specifically defined (BAER & SAXON, op. Cit. supra
note 5, at 83, define them as "a relatively small corner"), the circumstances of virtually all
squeezes indicate that not even "relatively small" control of the spot market is characteristic.
For examples, see HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 316; HUBBARD, op. cit. supra note 2 at
396; MERRILL LYNCH, PIERcE, FENNER & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 9 at 37-38; see also
definition of Senator Pope, 80 CONG. REc. 8089 (1936). Since control of the spot market is
not involved, these operations can often be defeated either by the shorts' performance of
their contracts through delivery or by the replacement of existing shorts by merchants with
large spot holdings who can then deliver; still, some premiums can usually be exacted be-
fore either of these processes is initiated. See, e.g., HUBBARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 396.
27. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., op. cit. supra note 9, at 36-37.
28. Evidence of the damage of futures price dislocations is abundant. Speculators may
be driven out of the market by such fluctuations. Comment, Manipulation in Commodity
Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. Ci. L. R-v. 94, 102 (1953) ; Huebner,
Corners, 4 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 409 (1931). And hedgers will pass the burden of such disloca-
tions, which are often significant, on to consumers in the form of higher prices. See HOWELL,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 30-33; HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4. For a typical example
of the manner in which a hedger may find himself in the market at the time a future is
maturing, when the price dislocations may be most sudden, see MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 36-38.
29. 49 Stat. 1491 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17(a) (1958). Its forerunner was
the Grain Futures Act, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), which survived constitutional attack in Board
of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
30. 49 Stat. 1501 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1958) ; see also 42 Stat. 1002
(1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1958). There is considerable evidence that the elimination
of price manipulation was the prime force in moving Congress to adopt regulatory measures.
See 42 Stat. 999 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) ; H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3




either in itself or in relation to other markets". 31 In its broad sweep, this defini-
tion includes all intentional, while excluding all inadvertent, activity.3 2 Such a
distinction, based on the intent of the trader, is entirely consistent with the
congressional aims in enacting regulatory legislation ;33 it also comports with
the understanding of traders themselves, who regard activities such as the
squeeze as manipulative. 34 Under this definition, a determination of manipula-
tion does not depend on the price pattern on the futures exchange ;3 theoret-
ically, if the requisite showing of intent can be made, activity is proscribed
even if it has the result of halting damaging discrepancies between price move-
ments on the futures and spot markets. 36 The definition has decided ad-
vantages over other standards, such as the causing of any price change; by ex-
cluding inadvertent actions, it neither penalizes functional and occasionally
necessary transactions on the exchange by hedgers, nor discourages the bene-
ficial operations of speculators.37
While this formulation, focusing on intent, includes the squeeze within
proscribed activity, it might create substantial problems of proof, with a re-
sulting risk of interference with market operations, if no workable standard
could be found for determining intent in squeeze situations.38 One method of
avoiding this problem would be to include within the definition only those
operations in which a trader creates as well as exploits a potentially dangerous
31. Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962). See also General Foods
Corp., 6 Agri. Dec. 288,305 (1947).
32. Great Western Food Distribs. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 483-84 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
33. The fact that the legislators in 1922 showed considerable concern over basing sanc-
tions on a finding of knowing malfeasance supports the view that a showing of intent to
manipulate should be required before sanctions are imposed. See 62 CONG. REC. 9407, 12568
(1922).
34. 7 FTC, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 219 (1926); Comment, Manipulation in
Commodity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 94, 99-100 (1953).
35. See, e.g., General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948), where
the court, in reversing an administrative finding of manipulation of rye futures, concerned
itself only slightly with the price effects of petitioners' conduct and devoted primary atten-
tion to their state of mind. Similarly, in Moore v. Brannan, 191 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951), the Court of Appeals, in affirming a suspension of trading
privileges, ignored the fact that petitioner's attempt to influence prices by circulating false
rumors as to federal agricultural policy had failed. See Ralph W. Moore, 9 Agri. Dec.
1299 (1950).
36. Such a showing may often be nearly impossible to make, however; the problems any
court normally encounters in inferring a party's state of mind from his conduct will be
multiplied where prices had been returning to their normal pattern and the defendant's con-
duct thus approximates normal market behavior.
37. Such developments, of course, would hardly be salutary, considering the valuable
role played by speculators and the functional use of the exchange by hedgers. See text ac-
companying notes 7-11 supra. If there were no intent requirement, such a development
would seem inevitable, since the effect of one's conduct would be the only criterion, leaving
the standard merely the unreasonableness of the price change caused by one's actions. In
addition, a constitutional objection might be raised to a definition. It might be attacked as
so vague that traders could not be sure what actions were legal and what were not.
38. See note 37 supra.
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situation. Thus, where a trader has spread rumors or cornered the market by
buying up the available supply of a spot commodity-where he has, in other
words, prepared the market for exploitation-there will be little problem in
finding manipulation. Such action is largely inconsistent with any rational mo-
tive other than a desire to influence prices.39 A squeeze, on the other hand, in-
volves no such preparation of the market for exploitation; although the deliber-
ate holding of a large futures position late in the delivery month, playing upon
seller expectation that delivery will not be required, is recognized as manipula-
tive, it will often appear so like ordinary market behavior that substantial prob-
lems of proof, along with a substantial risk of penalizing necessary market be-
havior, will come into existence if regulation is essayed. The manipulator is not
likely to have given direct evidence of his intent, and the state of his mind must
therefore be ascertained by reference to his conduct. But late holdings are in
many circumstances an expected manifestation of the market's ordinary price
correction mechanism. And they may also result from a merchant's late failure
to liquidate a hedge. The narrower definition of manipulation, which would
exclude squeezes by requiring evidence of creation of market weaknesses as
well as intent to exploit, would not so much deny that squeezes are manipula-
tive or harmful,40 as hold that they can not be sieved out of everyday market
behavior without inordinate cost to market functioning.
It was this problem of definition which appeared to trouble the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Volkart Bros. v. Freeman ;41 its decision was so broadly
stated as to deny the possibility of government regulation of squeeze situa-
tions.42 Volkart Bros. was a highly experienced and respected cotton broker-
age firm which traded on the commodities exchange and also had extensive
dealings in the wholesale cotton market.48 In early October, 1957, Volkart held
a significant bloc of October cotton futures on the New York Cotton Ex-
change. 44 While other purchasers were liquidating their interests, diminishing
the total volume of futures contracts outstanding, Volkart Bros. not only re-
tained its New York holdings, but simultaneously made a large purchase of
39. Such operations are usually so extreme .that their purpose cannot easily be dis-
guised. See examples cited notes 22 and 25 supra.
40. In addition to the clear congressional desire to eliminate all manipulation (supra
note 30), the Federal Trade Commission, in its exhaustive study of the grain trade, ex-
pressed a desire to eliminate squeezes, though without specifying a method of doing so. 7
FTC, REPORT ON THE GRAi TRADE 271 (1926).
41. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
42. id. at 59.
43. Volkart had large cotton stocks and commitments, both foreign and domestic, al-
though its interest in the spot market in October, 1957, was relatively small, constituting less
than 10% of the stock of certificated spot cotton. It was a member of both New York and
New Orleans cotton exchanges. Volkart Bros., 20 Agri. Dec. 306, 324-25 (1961) ;
Respondents' App., p. 85; Exchange Brief, pp. 24, 61. These dual occupations, it might be
noted, put Volkart in the advantageous position of being able to take delivery on futures
contracts without suffering undue inconvenience, a position necessarily highly beneficial to
any trader bent on influencing prices by a squeeze. HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 316.
44. Respondents' App., p. 34 .
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futures on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange.45 By October 11, the stock of
cotton certificated, and thus readily available for delivery by sellers who failed
to offset, amounted to less than half of Volkart's combined New York-New
Orleans interest.46 Throughout October, it announced its willingness to offset
only at a price slightly above the market price.47 And on the final day of Oc-
tober trading, Volkart's prices were raised to even higher over-all levels, which
became the market price due to the firm's substantial holdings. By these opera-
tions, Volkart was able to reap a profit of over $20,000 on the final day of trad-
ing.48 In a proceeding stimulated by the complaints of the "squeezed" sellers,
the Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture found Volkart Bros.
guilty of having manipulated prices. Its trading privileges were suspended for
fifteen days.49
Although the Fifth Circuit held on review that "the weight of the evidence
does not support the findings that petitioners manipulated or attempted to
manipulate futures prices . . . "50 its opinion does not otherwise evidence the
re-examination of factual findings which would normally be expected where an
administrative ruling is reversed on the facts.5 ' The court did not demonstrate
45. Ibid.; Volkart Bros. 20 Agri. Dec. 306, 317 (1961).
46. Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 56 (5th Cir. 1962). The only alternative to
offsetting or delivery of certificated cotton which remained for sellers was to arrange for
delivery of cotton which had not yet been certificated; issue to futures holders transferable
notices for this cotton, estimating its grade; and have it certificated within five business days
of issuing the notice. Volkart Bros., 20 Agri. Dec. 306, 316-17 (1961). By the final days of
trading, the financial risks of this approach (the Exchange, it will be remembered, imposed
rather substantial penalties if the cotton was not of acceptable grade) had combined with the
difficulties in meeting the strict time deadlines to make this solution commercially un-
feasible. Several expert witnesses so testified at the hearing before the referee in the
Agriculture Department. Brief for Respondents, pp. 68-69, Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962) (Hereinafter cited as Respondents' Brief). The Cotton Exchange,
in its brief, admitted the fact that arrangements for delivery of uncertificated cotton could
not be made at the close of trading, asserting the same to be true if certificated stock were to
be delivered. Exchange Brief, p. 36 .
47. Respondents' App. p. 35, 37.
48. Volkart Bros., 20 Agri. Dec. 306, 318-19 (1961).
49. Id. at 341. The administrative structure developed in the Agriculture Department
for hearing complaints of this nature deserves mention here. The Agriculture Department,
on behalf of aggrieved parties (here the squeezed sellers), files a complaint with the Depart-
ment's Judicial Officer, who, after testimony has been heard by a hearing examiner who
recommends a decision, imposes sanctions where necessary. His decision is final unless ap-
pealed to a United States Court of Appeals. Flavin, The Functions of the Judicial Offlcer,
United States Department of Agriculture, 26 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 277 (1958). The Depart-
ment thus plays the dual role of both prosecutor and judge in actions brought under the
various agricultural regulatory statutes, although within the department "there is a complete
separation of prosecuting and deciding functions... ." Id. at 284.
50. 311F.2dat6O.
51. The court carefully stated the arguments on both sides as to Volkart's intent, and
the Judicial Officer's resolution of them, but failed itself to take explicit stand on them. 311
F.2d at 57-58. Further, in order to overturn the Judicial Officer's findings of fact, an explicit
holding that they were unsupported by substantial evidence would seem necessary, but was
not made by the court. See 4 DAvis, AMINixSTRATIvE LAW, § 29.01 (1958).
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that Volkart's behavior was as consistent with an innocent motive as with the
guilty intent inferred by the administrative agency. Indeed, the court con-
cerned itself very little with Volkart's actual state of mind. The opinion, in
its broadest reach, expresses a finding of law that, irrespective of whether
someone in Volkart's position intended, or was able, to manipulate futures
prices, such conduct was not punishable as "manipulation" under the Com-
modity Exchange Act.5 2 Manipulation was punishable, in the court's view,
only if it involved creating as well as exploiting market weaknesses.r3
This narrow reading of the Act, precluding judicial regulation of squeezes,
seems predicated on two distinct considerations-a fear of turning the com-
modities exchange into a "gambling institution," and a preference for the exer-
cise of self-control by the exchanges in an area where judicially enforced
regulation might disturb market operation. Thus, the court argued, Volkart's
conduct could not be impugned without casting doubt on the legality of the en-
tire functioning of the Cotton Exchange.5 4 Volkart had not itself created the
shortage of certificated cotton, it had merely exploited it ;r consequently its
only active "wrong," in the court's view, was its insistence that its futures
contracts be satisfied by the delivery of actual cotton. The court disagreed prin-
cipally with the Judicial Officer's view that Volkart should not have insisted
on delivery.56 If the purchaser is precluded from insisting on delivery, the
court reasoned, it would be tantamount to "excus[ing the sellers] from the
performance of their contracts. '5 7 If that were the case, the court implied, the
contract between Volkart and the sellers-and indeed, between all purchasers
and sellers on the Exchange-would be no more than a wager on the future
price of cotton: a bet by which one party would win if the price of cotton rose
by a certain date and the other would win if it dropped. s
The court's appraisal of this delivery aspect of futures contracts is not well
founded. The Supreme Court has held that trading in grain futures where de-
livery of actual grain is neither desired nor intended by the parties does not
constitute illegal wagering.59 The Court recognized that the true economic
function of futures trading was to hedge against the possible impact of market
fluctuation, and that "it is.. . a serious business contract for a legitimate and
52. Thus, the court felt that Volkart's failure to control the spot market was a key
factor indicating the culpability of Volkart's conduct. Disregarding commercial reality en-
tirely, it noted that only if the sellers were unable, despite diligence and foresight, to fulfill
their delivery obligation could Volkart be held to have created prices "not responsive to
the forces of supply and demand." 311 F2d at 59-60.
53. Id. at 59.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Volkart's interest in the stock of certificated cotton was relatively small, see note 43
supra, a fact considered significant by the Court. 311 F.2d at 59.
56. At the same time, the court failed to overrule the finding that Volkart's conduct had
not constituted a valid holding out for delivery. Volkart Bros., 20 Agric. Dec. 306, 335-37
(1961).
57. 311 F.2d at 60.
58. Ibid.
59. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Supply Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
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useful purpose."' 0 Hedging is thus distinguishable from illegal gambling on
the same grounds as insurance-that it performs a useful and proper social
function. 61
In addition to the common-law attack on the Department's finding, the
court obviously had considerable confidence in the ability of the Exchange to
handle such problems. In one manifestation of its preference for exchange self-
regulation, the Fifth Circuit relied on the inactivity of the Exchange's con-
trol machinery during October, 1957, to indicate that defendant's conduct was
not reprehensible. The New York Cotton Exchange would have been in an
"excellent position"6 2 for discerning high jinks, the court noted, and had a
standard technique for countering undue fluctuation-the invitation of mer-
chant members to replace the sellers and make delivery for them.68 Dependence
on such techniques was implicitly urged by the Exchange,6 4 which submitted
an amicus curiae brief predicting dire effects on its operations should its mem-
ber, Volkart, be found guilty of manipulation in the circumstances of this
case. 65 This approach is also faulty, however. For the Exchange is managed
by brokers who deal on it.66 And although private control of abuses is often
desired, Congress, in enacting extensive regulatory legislation for futures ex-
changes, delegated control over manipulation to the Agriculture Department,
thus apparently deciding that self-control is either an impracticable or an un-
desirable means of curbing manipulation.
6
'
60. Id. at 249.
61. While of course hedging is an aleatory contract, it need not by virtue of that fact
be an unlawful wager. For aleatory contracts are by no means uniformly unlawful wagers.
Corbin posits three requirements for the illegal gambling agreement: it contains promises
performable upon the happening of some fortuitous event; no performance is promised in
return for the conditionally promised performance; and, most important, the risk assumed
by the promisor is one created by the bargain, not an already existing hazard which is merely
being shifted from promisee to promisor. 6A CoRBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 1481 (1961). While each
side in the normal hedge on a futures exchange is in essence making the sort of promise out-
lined in the first two requisites for a wager, the risk involved is not created by the bargain.
It is the price risk which a merchant must bear if he does not enter the exchange. The
hedging contract is thus a lawful aleatory contract, clearly analogous to an insurance agree-
ment, which is also a bargain based on chance and founded upon the desire to shift already
existing risk from promisee to promisor. VAxcE, IxsuRANcE 93 (3d ed. 1958).
62. 311F.2dat 58.
63. Exchange Brief, p. 17.
64. Exchange Brief, pp. 16-20; see N.Y. CoTTON EXCHANGE, op. cit. supra note 14, § 115.
The Control Committee of the Exchange deals with relatively small problems, such as likely
squeezes when longs are obstinate in their desire to hold out for delivery or extraordinarily
high prices and some shorts cannot deliver. It asks merchant members of the exchange to
replace the shorts who are unprepared for delivery. When a threatened congestion is too
great to be handled by the Committee, the Board of Managers may take more severe steps,
such as halting trading. The fact that no corrective steps were taken in the present case, how-
ever, seems in itself to indicate the shortcomings of exchange regulation of congested situa-
tions.
65. Exchange Brief, pp. 60-62.
66. N.Y. COTTON ExcHIANGE, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1.
67. Since curbs on excessive speculation and resulting fluctuation were the congressional
objectives which the prohibition of manipulation was hoped to effect, it seems very probable
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What may have bothered the court most, however, was a fear that regula-
tion of squeezes would interfere too greatly with the operation of the market-
place, posing greater costs than returns. Thus, the court noted, Volkart could
be penalized for its conduct "only upon the assumption that the shorts should
not be held to their contract obligation to deliver the cotton."6 s If shorts, the
sellers of futures contracts, were not required to convey actual cotton in satis-
faction of their contracts, the effectiveness of the exchange's operations would
be severely impaired. But this analysis of the impact a finding of guilt would
have on the exchange is troublesome. The normal commercial expectation of
all who deal on the Cotton Exchange is that actual delivery will not be de-
manded by a purchaser of futures, to whom delivery is rarely economically ad-
vantageous.6 9 Where the futures price is significantly higher than the spot
price, it will be uneconomical for a holder of futures contracts to take de-
livery.70 Even where a normal futures-spot price relationship exists, the fact
that the purchaser usually did not enter the market to obtain the physical com-
modity and can not be certain of the grade of the commodity he would receive
makes delivery impractical. 71 Finally, the sellers' failure to deliver the com-
modity where the futures price is markedly below the spot price will not nor-
mally inconvenience buyers. Purchasers holding out for delivery to effectuate
a spread will only force sellers to bid up prices until they reach their normal
conformity with spot prices. At that point, purchasers will again find it profit-
able to offset, and the delivery requirement thus usually will fulfill its function
of keeping prices in line without the sellers having to convey commodities.72
The requirement will thus work to stimulate the price rise which makes its en-
that inclusion of squeezes within regulated activity was intended. See note 30 supra; see
also 62 CoNG. REc. 9404, 9425, 9427 (1922).
68. 311 F.2d at 60.
69. See notes 12-14 supra, and accompanying text.
70. This seems hardly questionable, since by offsetting, the purchaser would not only
avoid the disadvantages of taking delivery on a futures market, but would in addition make
a clear profit by liquidating his interest at the high futures price and fulfilling his commodity
needs from the spot market.
71. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra. Admittedly, when a purchaser holds a
quantity of contracts roughly equivalent to, or greater than, the amount of certificated com-
modity available, he can reasonably anticipate, by learning the grades of the certificated
stock, the qualities he would receive by delivery. But in that case sellers would find it
economical to deliver the amount of certificated cotton on hand rather than bid up the offset
price (at least unless short waited until the end of trading on the final day, at which time
even this alternative would be difficult). True, where delivery on all contracts would require
shorts to undergo the more difficult process of delivering uncertificated commodity-as was
the case in Volkart-they may bid up the offset price substantially above the spot price
rather than deliver. See note 46 supra. Where that situation exists, however, the holder
would be aware that sellers would deliver some uncertificated commodity, whose grades
(since he could not know the source of the commodity) he would not know in advance. He
would normally, therefore, find it more profitable to offset than to force delivery.
72. Very occasionally, delivery is actually necessary to drive prices back into their
normal conformity, perhaps even in several successive months. See note 20 supra. Such was
not the case in Volkart.
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forcement unnecessary. This effect is itself part of the expected market mechan-
ism. While the delivery requirement is essential to market function, then, the
daily operation of commodity markets contradicts the view that if the exchange
mechanism is to function, sellers must in fact prepare to transfer actual com-
modities, regardless of the difficulty of doing so.73 Indeed, should such prepara-
tion regularly occur, it might work considerable harm to market operations by
depriving the market of its insurance function, through its conversion into an
alternate spot market.74 And if the court's analysis were adopted, the absence
of judicial control over use of the delivery requirement would only encourage at-
tempts to squeeze.
It is also unclear that a holding against Volkart would have had the effect of
removing the delivery requirement from the contract. Even assuming that the
finding of manipulation would retrospectively excuse a seller from delivery, it
is doubtful that the seller would often avail himself of an opportunity to renege.
Knowing neither the purchaser nor his intent, 5 he can hardly afford to gamble
73. Despite the tenacity with which cotton brokers and the exchanges defend the im-
portance of delivery, Interview with Mr. J. Stewart, former Member, Board of Managers,
New York Cotton Exchange, in New York City, June 26, 1963; Exchange Brief, pp. 5-6,
commentators appear constantly less willing to credit its significance. See, e.g., Working,
Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 Am. EcoN. REv. 314, 315-17 (1953). Today, of course,
virtually all traders satisfy their contracts by offset. Thus on the Chicago Board of Trade, on
which 88% of all exchange trading in grain in the United States takes place, more than 99%
of all contracts are fulfilled by offset. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UroN ORGANIZED CoM-
MODIxTY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 106-08 (1932) ; BAER & SAxoN, COMMODITY Ex-
CHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 210 (1949). Significantly, Volkart was the sole trader to
take delivery on his contracts in the October, 1957, cotton future. Volkart Bros., 20 Agri.
Dec. 306, 319 (1961). Even assuming, however, that the delivery requirement is so valuable
that it should be rigidly enforced, the decision in the present case, considering the area of
possible manipulation it leaves unregulated, seems a less than ideal way to safeguard the re-
quirement. Affirmance'of the Judicial Officer's decision, on the other hand, might have
pressed exchanges which wished to retain the vitality of this requirement to modify and im-
prove their by-laws with regard to it. Thus, the cotton exchanges might enact a regulation
which granted longer periods after the final days of trading for delivering certificated cotton
or for getting uncertificated cotton approved. In addition, replacement by the seller of un-
satisfactory cotton might be allowed, which would reduce the danger of extensive contract
damages. Sellers would then be less pressured when delivery was apparently desired by
buyers, and would have sufficient time to make preparations for and satisfy -their contracts
by delivering.
74. If sellers prepared for delivery to a significant degree, many would purchase de-
liverable commodities early in delivery month. And having done so, they might issue de-
livery notices in large quantities and simply convey their goods to purchasers rather than
dispose of them on the spot market after offsetting their futures. (This would be especially
likely where spot prices are relatively low, since sale on the spot market would be unprofit-
able.) This result would hardly be satisfactory to most buyers, who would be burdened by
being forced to take delivery, and it could lead them to sell heavily and quickly during the
final month, thus generating further price instability on the exchange. After they had
learned of this liklihood, however, buyers might cease using the exchange for insurance
purposes, and rely on it as nothing more than a spot market in which delivery of goods was
guaranteed by the exchange clearing house.
75. Since the clearing house substitutes itself for each party to a contract vis-a-vis the
other party, a seller cannot know to whom he may owe delivery. See note 17 supra.
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substantial penalties on the result of a subsequent administrative determination
of manipulation vel non. Finally, the effectiveness of the delivery requirement
would not be lessened in situations where the futures-spot price relation is al-
ready dislocated. Proscribing squeezes of the Volkart variety would principal-
ly affect large traders capable of affecting the market by intentional action.
But when a dislocation exists, it is the market-compelled reaction of small
speculators and hedgers which assures the return of prices to their normal re-
lationship.76 In sum, the judicial Officer's decision may be seen, not as destroy-
ing the vitality of the contract, but as reading its terms in a manner consistent
with commercial practice and existing regulation. In effect, the literal terms of
the instrument are modified to include a "good faith" provision, that the de-
mand for delivery arise from some impetus other than the hope of capitalizing
on seller expectations. This, of course, raises the ultimately difficult problem:
determining from trader action whether delivery was sought in good faith.
This determination forms the analytic nub of the problem of regulating
squeezes, which the court avoided by exempting squeezes from regulation al-
together.
The court's position is justified only if the facts from which intent must be
inferred are always as consistent with an innocent intent and the ordinary
functioning of the exchange as with a manipulative intent.77 While some mis-
creants may inevitably escape under the cover of ambiguity, this is not a sound
reason for refusing to punish those who can not. Intent will sometimes appear
clearly. There may be direct evidence of it.71 And there may be some acts non-
ambiguous in indicating manipulative intent, which can serve to aid a decision
maker willing to prosecute manipulators whenever manipulation can be clearly
established. Factors which necessarily are ambiguous in their implications will
of course fail to serve this purpose. If a trader's prolonged refusal to offset
holdings can reasonably be characterized as a hedge for a spot sale not covered
by a corresponding spot purchase until late in the delivery month, a court
should not infer an intent to manipulate. Equally, a trader's actions might be
interpreted as an ordinary reaction to unusually low futures prices. In this
76. See Working, Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 Aim. Ecox. ZEv. 314, 325 (1953).
Working believes that a great deal of hedging is based on merchants' beliefs as to the current
relation of spot and futures prices and the likely future course of that relation.
77. The inference must be, it should be remembered, based only on a preponderance of
evidence, and need not be compelled beyond any reasonable doubt. However severe may be
the administrative sanctions placed on manipulative conduct, there is no question that they
are remedial rather than penal in nature, designed to protect honest traders and enforce ad-
herence to the act's provisions. Thus the more rigid burden of proof need not be satisfied. See
Nichols v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F.2d 651, 659 (lst Cir.) rev'd on other grounds,
136 F.2d 503 (1st. Cir. 1943) ; Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1933). See
also Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940).
78. This occurrence, of course, is extremely rare. Even in cases such as Great Western
Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 484 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997
(1953) in which "direct" evidence of intent was found, it was clearly far more ambiguous
than the court held it to be. See Comment, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-
The Great Western Case, 21 U. CnI. L. REv. 94, 109 (1953).
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situation, it is to be anticipated that traders will hold either for delivery, if the
imbalance is a protracted one, or until the closing of the futures-spot price
gap. In short, where a refusal to offset is consistent with normal market con-
duct, such a refusal cannot be the basis for a finding of manipulation.
But other circumstances are not so ambiguous with respect to intent. Where
a speculator, who has no commodity to insure, holds out to a degree unex-
plainable by the current price relationships, no justifying factor appears.
Similarly for the hedger who takes futures contracts beyond his needs for
hedging, or who buys when hedging principles suggest he should sell. Another
indication of manipulative intent would be the making of arrangements to dis-
pose of any commodity which might be received. Such conduct would imply
that the trader expected some deliveries to be forced by his operations, but that
he did not desire to receive actual quantities of the commodity. 9 In addition, a
court should examine critically any conduct capable of misleading sellers as to
a purchaser's intent to hold out for delivery, such as setting prices for liquida-
tion during delivery month slightly above the market level. Where these factors
exist, any inference that the behavior was inadvertent would tend to be de-
feated if the trader were highly experienced in market operations; he would
then know and, inferentially, wish the consequences of his acts. If the trader
held a substantial bloc of outstanding contracts or obligations when the conduct
complained of occurred, and if the market had previously behaved normally,
the inference that he had acted in bad faith would be strengthened. As in anti-
trust regulation, size itself might serve to warn that private control was
responsible for abnormal market conduct.80
The facts of the Volkart case indicate a situation in which intent to manipu-
late could have been found without undue interference with the market's
ordinary operations. Volkart was an experienced brokerage firm, and conse-
quently it must have realized the inflationary effects that late holding of its
interest would have. It must also have known that most sellers would not ex-
pect a demand to deliver and were hence vulnerable to a squeeze. Nor did
Volkart's protestations that it actually desired delivery appear to have much
merit. Volkart could not reasonably have expected to receive the qualities of
cotton it needed for its operations.81 Indeed, though it might, as a large-scale
merchant, have taken delivery of many grades, most of the cotton it in fact
received must have been unsatisfactory, since it delivered most of it in ful-
79. The problem of ridding oneself of unwanted deliveries after the collapse of high
prices caused by a corner or squeeze, often termed "burying the corpse," has often disturbed
seasoned and not so scrupulous traders. See HumBAmD, CoOToON AND THE CoTo N MARKET
393-94 (1927). One method of avoiding this problem consists in selling substantial quanti-
ties of contracts in the next delivery month and fulfilling them by delivering the commodities
received as incidents of the corner or squeeze. Comment, Manipulation of Commodity Ft-
tures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. CHa. L. REv. 94, 101 (1953).
80. See NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF TiHE U.S.A. 109-16 (1960).
81. Indeed, there is little question that Volkart knew it could not receive delivery on its
entire open interest. An officer of the firm estimated that it had received delivery on about
one-half its contracts, which he apparently considered a high percentage. Interview with
Kurt Muller, Vice-President, Volkart Bros., Inc., Respondents' App. at 82.
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fillment of its obligations in December futures. 82 And its action throughout
October in setting prices, albeit above the market price, on all its open con-
tracts would seem to indicate more a willingness to offset than a desire
to receive actual cotton. 3 Further, there seems little likelihood that the
firm's operations were merely unterminated hedging in October futures; dur-
ing late September and October its futures operations were not equivalent
and opposite to its transactions. On some days it actually bought both
spot cotton and futures.8 4 Moreover, as a hedger Volkart had no substan-
tial need to purchase October futures since its stocks of cotton far out-
matched its sales commitments, a position which to a strict hedger would call
for a substantial futures sales.8 5 Volkart obviously was not hedging, then, nor
is it probable that it was simply holding out for delivery. Rather, it seems
likely, given the firm's experience in the market and its knowledge of the
sellers' probable expectations, that it was intent on creating a squeeze, one
from which it eventually reaped a substantial profit.86
The difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's treatment of the problem was its ap-
parent assumption of an either-or position in treating the delivery requirement.
The alternatives are not so stark as the ability or disability of traders arbitrar-
ily to stand on their literal contract rights; the presence of federal market reg-
ulation proscribing manipulation suggests that limiting enforcement of the
delivery requirement to good faith situations is consistent with the maintenance
of a soundly operating commodity exchange.
82. Id. at 63.
83. Volkart set prices for liquidation from October 1 through October 14. Id. at 35, 37.
84. Respondents' Brief at 951.
85. Both its domestic and its foreign stocks outnumbered its commitments by substantial
amounts. Volkart Bros., 20 Agri. Dec. 306, 324-25 (1961).
86. The Agriculture Department arrived at the conclusion, undisputed by the Court of
Appeals, that Volkart had profited by approximately $21,230 from the rise in the final day of
trading. Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962).
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